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Reply to De Brabanter 
 
François Recanati 
 
 
 
Philippe De Brabanter’s survey of my work on quotation is terrific and 
I am really glad that we agree on all the basics. Here I will concentrate on 
two pieces of criticism he offers. One pertains to an internal contradiction he 
spotted in my analysis of mixed quotation; the other criticism targets the move 
I make in Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta and in ‘Open Quotation Revisited’ to-
wards a semanticization of the context-shift at work in hybrid quotation. 
 
 
I. CAN FREE ENRICHMENT BE DRIVEN BY QUOTATIONAL POINT? 
 
I claim that quotational point belongs to ‘the most pragmatic layer of in-
terpretation’, and at the same time I say that, in mixed quotation, quotational 
point affects truth-conditions via free enrichment. From these claims, and my 
distinction between primary vs secondary pragmatic processes, De Brabanter 
derives a contradiction. Since free enrichment is a primary pragmatic process 
operating at a sub-personal level, 
 
We have a situation in which something that is reputed to belong to “the most 
pragmatic layer of interpretation” has already been processed locally at a level 
of interpretation that requires no availability (and no genuine inference). As far 
as I can judge, there is no manifest solution for the meaningful articulation of 
those two processes.1 
 
The two processes De Brabanter is talking about are: the primary process of 
free enrichment, and the grasp of the speaker’s intention in quoting 
(‘quotational point’). Grasp of the speaker’s intention results from a reflective 
process that seems impossible unless the availability condition is satisfied. 
This suggests that quotational point recognition may be a secondary process 
(i.e. a pragmatic process that presupposes some antecedent grasp of what is 
said, rather than a pragmatic process that contributes to the interpreter’s grasp 
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of what is said). The contradiction comes out as follows:  
 
On the one hand, Recanati writes that, in grasping that the speaker is ascribing 
the string has a certain anomalous feature to Quine, the interpreter understands 
a quotational point [Recanati (2010), p. 249], i.e. the speaker’s intention. On the 
other, this ascription is described as a primary pragmatic process of enrichment. 
Do these two descriptions capture one and the same interpretive event? Strictly 
speaking, that is impossible, since we are dealing with processes that the theory 
says are different in nature. However, Recanati (2010), p. 255, may seem to be 
saying so much when he states that this “aspect of the interpretation of the ut-
terance, relating to the point of the demonstration [letting the addressee know 
that “Quine used those very words in the speech episode which the utterance 
reports”], is utterly pragmatic, yet it affects the intuitive truth-conditional con-
tent of the utterance”. 
 
How can I get out of the contradiction? One option would be to deny 
that grasp of quotational point is a secondary process or one that requires sat-
isfaction of the availability condition.
2
 Arguably, grasp of quotational point 
can be subserved by diverse mechanisms. One can take a reflective route and 
assess the reasons behind the speech act. Or one can proceed automatically if 
the context is of a type that standardly triggers a particular interpretation of 
quotational point. Ascription sentences, such as speech reports, are one such 
context: in ascription contexts it is given that the speaker is reporting some-
one’s speech, so the interpretation of quotational point as ‘ascriptional’ (and 
targetting the reportee) is natural in such contexts and may be automatically 
provided as the default interpretation. This is compatible with the availability 
condition’s not being satisfied. As De Brabanter puts it in the draft I mentioned,  
 
The identification of quotational points should not always be understood to be-
long to the “most pragmatic layer of interpretation”. The idea would be that in 
certain cases — that would include most cases of mixed quotation — identifica-
tion of the point is simply made redundant by processing that has taken place at 
a lower level. 
 
Taking this on board, my analysis of Davidson’s standard example of 
mixed quotation (‘Quine says that quotation “has a certain anomalous fea-
ture”’) could be revised as follows. Quotational point is assigned by default 
because the context is explicitly ascriptional. So an ascription of the quoted 
words to the reportee is generated. That is a second proposition which comes 
in addition to the proposition compositionally expressed by the utterance. In 
Davidson’s example, the proposition compositionally expressed by the utter-
ance is the proposition that Quine said that quotation has a certain anomalous 
feature, while the second proposition — that which is pragmatically generated 
through grasp of quotational point — is the proposition that Quine used the 
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quoted words in the speech episode which the utterance reports. Since both 
propositions can be integrated as a description of one and the same event, 
free enrichment is licensed [Recanati (2010), pp. 277-78]: an additional truth-
condition is generated for the utterance, corresponding to the second proposi-
tion. This gives us the intuitive truth-conditions of the mixed-quoting utter-
ance (Quine said that quotation has a certain anomalous feature, and he said 
so using the words ‘has a certain anomalous feature’). 
Standardized or default pragmatic interpretations have often been dis-
cussed in the pragmatics literature [Bach and Harnish (1979); Levinson 
(2000)], starting with Grice’s introduction of generalized conversational 
implicatures [Grice (1989)]. Default interpretations have a significant level of 
systematicity, and for that reason many theorists consider they belong to se-
mantics rather than pragmatics [Asher (2011)]. This I take to be for the most 
part a terminological issue. Be that as it may, what De Brabanter’s discussion 
suggests is that a pragmatic approach to mixed quotation such as the one I 
have developed may need to appeal to the idea of default interpretation. The 
gap between the pragmatic approach and semantic approaches à la Cappelen 
and Lepore is thereby somewhat diminished. 
There is another option, however. It consists in giving up the claim that 
the ascription of the quoted words to the reportee is a matter of free enrich-
ment. That seems to be the option which De Brabanter now favours. He 
writes: 
 
I feel reluctant to accept that we are dealing with a primary pragmatic process. 
The main reason is that it seems clear that identification of the quotational point 
must be ‘available’. (…) This… makes it sufficiently different from other cases 
of enrichment described in TCP to question its status as a primary pragmatic 
process. Though I am not sure how to sort out the above difficulty, I believe it 
needs to be recognised. A primary pragmatic process that must be available is 
not a proper primary pragmatic process [this issue, pp. 00] 
 
Is there a third option? Well, yes – one may deny that there is a genuine 
problem in the first place. I think the difficulty emphasized by De Brabanter 
arises because the interpreter’s grasp of quotational point (which I say be-
longs to the “most pragmatic layer of interpretation”, a level at which one 
tries to understand the reasons behind a speech act) is construed as the same 
process as the primary pragmatic process of free enrichment which I invoke 
to account for the intuitive truth-conditions of mixed-quotational utterances. 
But these are actually distinct processes, and the problem vanishes, or at least 
deflates, when one realizes that they are. 
Grasp of quotational point is ‘utterly pragmatic’ (I maintain) because it 
is not a matter of deciphering the linguistic signal but involves making sense 
of the speech act: the speaker has ‘demonstrated’ some aspect of the linguistic 
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material (the quoted words), and the interpreter’s pragmatic task is to under-
stand why the speaker has done so. This is not different in nature from under-
standing why the speaker has said what she has said in contexts in which what 
she has said is mutually known to be false. This is what I mean when I say that 
grasp of quotational point belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation. 
Still, there is a significant difference between the interpreter’s grasp of 
quotational point and the interpreter’s grasp of irony. In the case of irony, the 
speech act which is being made sense of is the locutionary act of saying that 
p (where p is mutually known to be false), so the interpretive process — the 
search for the reasons behind the act — cannot start unless the interpreter un-
derstands that the speaker has said that p. In the other case, the speech act 
which is being made sense of is the quotational act of demonstrating the 
words one is using. To understand why the speaker has said what she has 
said, we need to grasp what she has said; but to understand the speaker’s 
echoic intention underlying his quotational act, there is no need to have fully 
grasped what the speaker is saying: the act the interpreter is trying to make 
sense of when assessing quotational point is the act of demonstrating the 
words ‘has a certain anomalous feature’, not the act of saying that p. The in-
terpretation of the quotational act actually parallels the interpretation of the 
spoken words as expressing a certain proposition, and on my account, far 
from presupposing an antecedent grasp of what is said, the interpretation of 
the quotational act itself contributes to the truth-conditional interpretation of 
the spoken words. So it is not a secondary pragmatic process. 
As an analogy, consider the recognition of the speaker’s referential in-
tention in using a demonstrative or a free pronoun. If the speaker nods in a 
certain direction and says ‘he is dangerous’, the interpreter has to make sense 
of the demonstration by assigning a particular referential intention to the 
speaker. In other words, the interpreter must understand who the speaker 
means, and this, again, is a fully pragmatic matter. But the pragmatic process 
of intention recognition at work here does not presuppose a prior grasp of 
what is said; on the contrary, what is said cannot be grasped unless the 
speaker’s referential intention is recognized (since what is said depends on 
the reference of the pronoun, and the reference of the pronoun itself depends 
upon who the speaker has in mind). In this case, a fully pragmatic process 
(recognition of the speaker’s referential intention) yields an output which 
serves as input to the primary pragmatic process of saturation, whereby the 
semantic value of the pronoun is assigned. Exactly the same problem might 
seem to arise as previously, and De Brabanter might ask the same question: 
how is it possible that one and the same process (the recognition of the 
speaker’s referential intention) is both a fully pragmatic process requiring 
availability and a ‘primary’ pragmatic process such that the availability con-
dition need not be satisfied? 
To answer the question, we need to clearly distinguish between the pro-
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cess of intention-recognition (in both the referential and the quotational case) 
and the primary pragmatic process it feeds into. The former, but not the latter, 
belongs to the most pragmatic layer of interpretation of the speech act. Pro-
cesses that belong to that layer (‘outer pragmatic processes’, for short) are 
personal rather than subpersonal processes and their inputs must be available to 
the interpreter. This condition is satisfied in both the quotational and the refer-
ential case. Recognition of quotational point or referential intention is an outer 
pragmatic process, so its input must be available, but here the input — what the 
interpreter has to make sense of — is not the locutionary act of saying that p, 
but the quotational act of hightlighting certain words one is using or the ref-
erential act of demonstrating something. 
Secondary pragmatic processes (e.g. the inference to conversational 
implicatures) are a special case of outer pragmatic process, namely the case 
in which the input to the process is the locutionary act of saying that p. In that 
special case, pragmatically making sense of the speech act requires one to 
have antecedently identified what is said. Recognition of quotational point or 
referential intention is also an outer pragmatic process, so its input must be 
available, but the input — what the interpreter has to make sense of — is no 
longer the locutionary act of saying that p. What must be ‘available’ to the in-
terpreter who tries to understand the speaker’s quotational/referential act is the 
quotational/referential act itself. Pragmatically making sense of that act does 
not require one to have antecedently identified what is said, so this is not a sec-
ondary pragmatic process, even though it is an outer pragmatic process. 
To sum up: grasp of quotational/referential intention is an outer prag-
matic process but it is not secondary. Not all outer processes are secondary: 
that depends upon the input they operate on. It is for that reason that the 
vague notion of ‘the most pragmatic layer of interpretation’ reveals the ten-
sion spotted by De Brabanter. If I am right, the tension only shows that we 
need a slightly more sophisticated apparatus. Besides the distinction between 
inner pragmatic processes involved in the blind computation of truth-
conditions (so called ‘primary’ pragmatic processes) and outer pragmatic 
processes taking place at the personal level and requiring reflection on the 
speech act, there is a further distinction amoung outer processes between 
those which do or do not presuppose a prior grasp of what is said. Those 
which do are ‘secondary’ pragmatic processes. We also need a distinction, 
among the outer pragmatic processes, between those that do and those that do 
not feed into primary pragmatic processes (enrichment or saturation, as the 
case may be). And that is the key to solving De Brabanter’s problem. 
In mixed quotation, on my account, grasp of quotational point (an outer 
process) feeds into free enrichment (an inner, primary pragmatic process). 
The interpretation of quotational point runs in parallel to the truth-conditional 
interpretation of the sentence and yields what I called the ‘second’ proposi-
tion, to the effect that Quine used the words ‘anomalous feature’ in the 
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locutionary act which the utterance reports. That extra proposition is an as-
pect of ‘speaker’s meaning’. It can be grasped as soon as one understands 
that the utterance reports something Quine said about quotation, and before 
one grasps the full truth-conditions of the report. Free enrichment is the pro-
cess whereby the second proposition in question, resulting from grasp of 
quotational point, is merged with the proposition compositionally expressed 
by the sentence (which need not be available — it is a matter of subpersonal 
computation). The merging operation yields the utterance’s intuitive truth-
conditions.  
Free enrichment proceeds blindly, as primary pragmatic processes do. 
That means, in particular, that its inputs (e.g. the proposition compositionally 
expressed) need not be consciously available for the process to operate. But 
to say that the inputs to free enrichment need not be available is not to say 
that they cannot be; and in the case at stake one of the inputs to free enrich-
ment is the output of another pragmatic interpretation process (grasp of 
quotational point) which is an outer pragmatic process and must therefore be 
available. 
 
 
II. SEMANTICIZATION OF CONTEXT-SHIFTS: A STEP BACKWARD? 
 
De Brabanter criticizes the semanticization move I make in ‘Open Quo-
tation Revisited’ (after Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta) and defends the more 
radically pragmatic approach in ‘Open Quotation’. But, I will argue, he con-
flates two distinct issues. One issue concerns the status of a particular inter-
pretation: is it the interpretation of a linguistic item occuring in the uttered 
sentence (semantic option), or is it the interpretation of some aspect of the 
speech act over and above the properly linguistic material (pragmatic option)? 
De Brabanter and I agree that the pragmatic option is preferable. De Brabanter 
thinks I take ‘a step backward’ because of my treatment of a second issue, in 
‘Open Quotation Revisited’. I argue that the context-shift induced by echoic 
quotations affect truth-conditions locally and therefore require a two-
dimensional apparatus with a character/content distinction. The context-shift 
affects the character, though not necessarily the content. To say that the con-
text-shift affects the character is to say that, as a result of the quotational act 
which induces the context-shift, a new character is generated. That character 
maps the context in which the echoic quotation occurs to the content ex-
pressed by the quoted material when interpreted in the shifted context. This is 
a ‘semanticization’ of the pragmatic process of context-shift, which is now 
represented as such in the character of the sentence hosting the hybrid quota-
tion. De Brabanter objects that if one takes the quotation marks themselves to 
be an operator that conventionally encodes, and effects, the context-shift, 
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then open quotation is treated as a wholly semantic phenomenon. The spirit 
of the pragmatic approach is lost. 
But, as I said, I think there are two orthogonal issues here. The semantici-
zation of the context-shift which I advocate has to do with the proper represen-
tation of the meaning of the hybrid. We must assign to the hybrid both a 
character and a content. The context-shift is built into the character. I main-
tain all these claims, but they do not entail that the character of the hybrid is 
necessarily determined by the linguistic meaning of the uttered material (and, 
in particular, by the conventional meaning of the quotation marks). It is pos-
sible to hold, with De Brabanter, that quoting is something the speaker does, 
not something the quotation marks do. What induces the context-shift, on this 
picture, is the speaker’s quotational act. But the context-shift so induced af-
fects the meaning of the utterance. We can therefore ascribe to the utterance 
(a complex entity involving both the linguistic material and the speaker’s 
quotational act, similar in this respect to Kaplan’s ‘occurrences’) a character 
which maps the context of utterance to the right content. This analysis uses 
tools from semantics, but the bearer of the relevant semantic property (here, 
the character) is the utterance, not the sentence. The speaker’s quotational act 
belongs to the utterance, on this picture, and it contributes to the determina-
tion of its character. 
It may seem strange that I assign the character to the utterance rather than 
to the sentence. But there is nothing new in this move. In the case of demon-
stratives, Kaplan taught us that what possesses a character is not the expression 
type (the demonstrative), but the expression type together with an intentional 
act of the speaker. A demonstrative without an associated ‘demonstration’ is 
semantically incomplete. In the quotational case, the character of the hybrid 
depends upon the speaker’s quotational act just as, in the demonstrative case, the 
character of the demonstrative depends upon the speaker’s demonstrative act. 
There remains a difference between the respective roles of the speaker’s 
demonstrative and quotational acts. That difference ultimately derives from 
the distinction between (mandatory) saturation and (optional) modulation 
[Recanati (2004), (2010)]. A demonstrative without a referential act is se-
mantically incomplete, Kaplan says. But if we take a hybrid and subtract the 
quotational act, what remains is no longer a hybrid: it is just a regular, 
quotationless expression of the language, and as such it may well possess a 
character. The speaker’s quotational act does not ‘complete’ what would oth-
erwise be an incomplete character; rather, it maps the (presumably complete) 
character of the quoted expression to a more complex character embodying 
the context-shift. This is very much like predicate transfer [Nunberg (1995)], 
a standard form of modulation that also maps one character to another. 
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NOTES 
 
1 This citation and the next come from an earlier, longer draft from which the 
two papers by De Brabanter in this issue have been extracted. 
2 This is the option advocated by De Brabanter in the earlier draft where the 
above citation comes from. 
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